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Chapter 1  
Introduction: Research Questions, Scope, Organization, 
and Background 
Following the Second World War, the international balance of power shifted, creating 
a new political landscape with the United States and the Soviet Union at the forefront, and 
these two powers, which did not cooperate very efficiently during the war, quickly became 
rivals to dominate the smoldering remains of the desolate political scene. This conflict would 
become known as the Cold War, and, while not involving open hostilities in any direct order 
of battle in Europe, it enveloped nearly every nation in one way or another and affected how 
nations formed international policies.  
 In 1945 Sweden was in a precarious situation despite staying neutral in the Second 
World War, for it was situated between the East and the West. With the Soviets advancing to 
Berlin, conquering all that was in their path, the Swedes were worried about how far the 
Soviet drive would go. Holding onto their traditional line of non-alignment during peacetime 
and neutrality in war time had left them in an isolated position in the wreckage of Europe. In 
the aftermath of the war, the Swedes faced a difficult challenge, for they had to reevaluate 
their security policy to fit the new power dynamic in the world. The Cold War had lasting 
effects in terms of Sweden’s security policy, namely in the dynamic between official 
proclamations and unofficial acts.  
 This thesis will examine the evolution of Sweden’s neutrality and security policies 
from 1945 to the contemporary period. It will place a focus on the juxtaposition between the 
evolution of declaratory doctrine and undeclared actions taken, for the two did not often 
align. Prior research has examined the subject of Sweden’s neutrality; however, these works 
do not display interest in examining the evolution of the security framework considering the 
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effects of Cold War policymaking. Previous studies have largely examined the credibility of 
Sweden’s neutrality policy; however, the question investigated here is not if the Swedes were 
neutral, but how their security policy, which is based in their official line of neutrality, has 
evolved over time to accommodate the changing political landscape. 
 To thoroughly explore that evolution, this thesis will scrutinize various aspects of 
foreign relations; therefore, diplomacy, military cooperation, and, an often-overlooked aspect, 
technological cooperation. The latter is rather important in the early stages of Sweden’s 
departure from its hardline of neutrality, and very few works1 focus on this aspect causing 
several accounts to miss it. By overlooking the technological aspect of Swedish foreign 
relations, historians have left out a key element for the western shift that occurred in Swedish 
policy from the 1940s to the 1980s, for as a neutral stuck between two great powers, Sweden 
was unable to maintain a strong defense without outside assistance. The search for this 
assistance led Sweden to the West, for Swedish cultural values align much closer to the West 
than with the East. Therefore, by missing the Swedish desire for defense technology, past 
works on the subject have overlooked a core aspect of why Sweden was willing to lean to the 
West.   
 The purpose this thesis sets out to fulfill is to define how Sweden’s security policy has 
changed throughout and after the Cold War, and why these changes occurred. To do so will 
require a focus on how Swedish officials presented these changes officially and how they 
acted on these changes in practice. It is known that Sweden followed a line of neutrality in 
war-time and non-alignment during times of peace beginning in 1815; therefore, it will first 
be necessary to define what neutrality means to the Swedes during the period following the 
Second World War. Swedish neutrality is rooted in two concepts, insecurity and morality, 
                                               
1 See Mikael Nilsson’s Tools of Hegemony: Military Technology and Swedish - American Security 
Relations, 1945-1962 for an in-depth account of technological cooperation on a military level.  
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and the goal of Swedish policymakers is to maintain a proper balance between these two 
concepts that fits into the political and security landscape during a given period.  
During the early Cold War period, Sweden, fearful of the Soviet threat to the East and 
from falling under the control of the United States to the West, toed a line that allowed them 
to achieve their policy goals by placing insecurity above morality in this balancing act. In 
doing so, Sweden sought to strengthen their security by reaching out to the West, especially 
regarding technology. This changed in the 1990s as the Cold War ended, for the lack of a 
threat of a global war between two great powers vanished. This change in the international 
system provided Sweden with an opportunity to modify the balance of their neutrality goals 
to allow for morality to overtake insecurity, and as NATO shifted to peacekeeping, Sweden 
became officially involved with the alliance to further its moral goals. Therefore, between 
1945 and the 1990s, Swedish objectives in relation to their neutrality policy changed, for they 
replaced the emphasis on their insecurity with a desire for moral intervention in multilateral 
peacekeeping.  
 As the great powers advanced their military technology, Sweden fell behind 
technologically; therefore, their lacking technology invalidated their neutrality as they were 
losing the means to enforce it during the Cold War. This presented the Swedes with a 
fundamental dilemma to their neutrality policy, for their weakness in comparison to the great 
powers forced them to approach one of the great powers to attempt to acquire such 
technology. Since their government, economy, and culture are akin to that of western nations, 
they approached the United States to attempt to rectify this issue. This lean represents the 
initial balance of Swedish neutrality for this study, for Sweden placed insecurity over 
morality to ensure that they gained access to the military technology required to adequately 
defend themselves and uphold their neutrality if challenged. 
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After rectifying the technological issues and shoring up Sweden’s security in the 
event of war, the Swedes began to rework the balance of their neutrality policy to more 
equally display the two components, insecurity and morality. This growing technological rift 
led the Swedes to realize that they could no longer defend themselves from a potential attack; 
therefore, their traditional defense policy, deterrence through neutrality backed by a strong 
military, was no longer viable. While they attempted to remedy this by reaching out to the 
West, they had to modify their approach to the Soviets too; therefore, toward the middle of 
the Cold War era, the Swedes altered their approach to neutrality regarding the Soviets by 
shifting from deterrence to assurance. They sought to assure the Soviets that they would not 
act against them while simultaneously leaning towards the West to bolster their defense. 
Although this lean was occurring, the Swedes set out to lead the public to believe otherwise; 
therefore, public statements throughout the period often contradict actual actions taken by the 
government and military. Thus, the Swedes began playing a double game with the East and 
the West by enacting two policies simultaneously, for they fell in line with the West to secure 
military technology while assuring the East that they posed no threat.  
 The change in Swedish policy goals in the 1990s mirror an external change in the 
international order, and the change is apparent in how Sweden defined neutrality. In the 
1990s and early 2000s, Sweden broadened their idea of neutrality to include cooperation in 
multi-lateral peacekeeping operations, and by doing this Sweden increased its cooperation 
with the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). Sweden’s cooperation often had to do with peacekeeping operations 
supported by the UN and carried out by NATO; therefore, Swedish goals had changed during 
the period from 1945 – present, for the value that was placed on shoring up Sweden’s 
defenses to curtail insecurity in the 1940s – 1960s became reversed by the 1990s as the value 
had transitioned to morality through multi-lateral peacekeeping.  
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 This thesis follows a chronological organization in four thematic sections: The Post-
War Era and the Foundation of Cooperation 1949 – 1952, The Intensified Period of 
Cooperation 1953 – 1979, The Decline of Cooperation 1980 – 1989, and The End of the Cold 
War and the New Role of NATO 1990 – Present. The final section on the post- Cold War Era 
will primarily focus on the culmination of the evolution of the Cold War era policies (most of 
the focus of this thesis) into a formalized cooperation with NATO in 1993; however, a brief 
section will consider how this cooperation has evolved since becoming formalized. 
 
Background 
 Sweden has followed its policy of neutrality since the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 
1815. Sweden does not have any formalized obligations to remain neutral. Sweden chose to 
follow a policy of neutrality of its own free-will, whereas, nations such as Austria and 
Switzerland have lawful origins in their policies of neutrality. Sweden has lapsed out of 
neutrality since 1815 prior to the First World War, such as Slesvig-holsteinska kriget (The 
First Schleswig War); however, the policy has generally been followed and respected by the 
Swedish government and advocated for by the Swedish people.2 The goals of Swedish 
neutrality revolved around keeping Sweden out of alliances that would draw them into a 
conflict and maintaining a moral superiority over warring nations. With the actions of the 
First World War, Sweden was emboldened with its security policy of neutrality, for it 
successfully kept them out of a global conflict. The fact that it was again successful in the 
Second World War gave even more credence to the reliability of the policy of neutrality.  
 In the aftermath of the German occupation in Norway and Denmark, Scandinavia was 
broken down and battered; therefore, the Swedish Defense Staff, in conjunction with 
                                               
2 Torbjörn Norman, “Stages in Swedish Neutrality,” in Neutrality in History: La neutralite dans 
l'histoire: Proceedings of the Conference on the History of Neutrality organized in Helsinki 9-12 
September 1992 under the auspices of the Commission of History of International Relations, ed. 
Jukka Nevakivi (Helsinki: Suomen historiallinen seura, 1993), 304.  
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Utrikesdepartementet (the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, UD) began to consider a plan for 
cooperation with Sweden’s Scandinavian neighbors for a policy of rearmament.3 This plan 
for rearmament evolved into a plan for a common defense union that would come to be 
known as the Scandinavian Defense Union (SDU) by 1948. Sweden´s aim behind the 
creation of the SDU was to keep the Scandinavian countries out of a great power alliance. 
Norway and Denmark wanted the West to back the SDU; however, Sweden had made it 
abundantly clear that they did not want any ties to any other alliance networks.  
The United States had a very clear reason for wanting an alliance with Denmark, for 
Greenland was in a prime position for a Western base. Likewise, Norway was a valuable 
partner as they owned islands in the Spitsbergen Archipelago, and the United States needed 
to secure these islands from Soviet military use. The United States policy regarding 
Scandinavia at the time - NSC 28/1 - stated that the United States should “influence Sweden 
to abandon this attitude of subjective neutrality and look toward eventual alignment with 
other Western Powers in such form as may be found collectively acceptable." The same 
document suggested that the United States should “strengthen the present tendency of 
Norway and Denmark to align themselves with the Western Powers."4 The primary American 
policy goal behind these desires was to prevent the Soviet Union from subjugating the 
Scandinavian nations while simultaneously attempting to draw them towards the West. 
Washington ran interference in the SDU discussions, and United States Ambassador 
to Sweden Matthews stressed to the Secretary of State that “our influence in Norway and 
Denmark should be directed toward discouraging any Scandinavian alliance at the Swedish 
price.”5 The American statement that the alliance could not expect to receive the luxury of 
                                               
3 Wilhelm Agrell, Den Stora Lögnen: Ett säkerhetspolitiskt dubbelspel i alltför många akter 
(Stockholm: Ordfront, 1991), 60, 
4 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Vol. III, Western Europe, eds. David H. Stauffer, et al. 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1974), Document 146.  
5 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Vol. III, Western Europe, eds. David H. Stauffer, et al. 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1974), Document 94. 
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purchasing American military equipment exerted political pressure on Sweden to move away 
from its hard neutrality in accordance with the goals the United States set forth in NSC 28/1.6  
With the memory of the occupation from the Second World War fresh in mind, the 
Norwegians and the Danes refused to join an alliance that was not backed by the West; 
therefore, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark ultimately failed to come to a consensus on how 
such an alliance would function and be tied to the West. The talks concluded in January 1949. 
Norway and Denmark would go on to join the North Atlantic Pact while Sweden returned to 
















                                               
6 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Vol. IV, Western Europe eds. David H. Stauffer, et al. 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1974), Document 430. See also Mikael 
Nilsson, “Amber Nine: NATO’s Secret Use of a Flight Path over Sweden and the Incorporation of 
Sweden in NATO’s Infrastructure,” Journal of Contemporary History, 44, no. 2 (2009): 289. 
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Chapter 2 
The Post-War Era and the Foundation of Cooperation 
1949 – 1952  
 Following the failure of the creation of an SDU, Sweden was faced with the growing 
Soviet threat to the East without Western support; therefore, their neutrality policy shifted 
insecurity to the forefront while trying to maintain an outward appearance of morality. Prime 
Minister Tage Erlander and Foreign Minister Östen Unden made statements to Parliament 
regarding Sweden’s return to formal non-alignment and neutrality. The two ministers made 
very similar speeches, and one of the prominent pillars of the policy was that Sweden “should 
not assume such duties or make such agreements with one power grouping that the other 
power grouping considers our territory opened up for the counterpart’s forward bases”; thus, 
the policy outline allowed for cooperation with another power to a limit.7 This cooperation 
would prove to play a vital role in Sweden’s ability to maintain its neutrality, for their policy 
provided for technological cooperation, regarding military equipment that would occur 
between Sweden and the United States to curtail Swedish insecurity. Providing that the other 
power bloc, the Soviets, did not view Sweden as a staging area for the West, cooperation 
would be permitted; therefore, the Swedes would value secrecy in their military preparations 
for war during peacetime.    
While the SDU proceedings failed to establish an official defense union, the SDU 
Committee had also investigated the viability of an option that consisted of secret defense 
cooperation, and in February 1949, the Chief of the Defense Staff (ÖB) Nils Swedlund wrote 
to Erlander about carrying out this peacetime cooperation by making a list that included: 
setting up communication channels, coordinating air defense and operations, standardization 
                                               
7 Regeringsmeddelande den 9 februari 1949, in Riktlinjer för den svenska utrikespolitiken: 
Sammanställning av officiella uttalanden (Riksdagens utrikesutskott, Kanslichefen, 1975).  
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of terminology, reporting and identification procedures, and the creation of a military weather 
service. The government approved several of these propositions, giving control to Swedlund.8 
They carried out this cooperation through lower level government officials, and it is 
commonly known as DNS (Denmark, Norway, Sweden) cooperation, with very little record 
keeping occurring. As shown above, some hints of this cooperation remain in archives; 
however, much of what occurred was undocumented.  
In the United States’ archives, records exist to corroborate this secret DNS 
cooperation. In a meeting on 22 November 1949, George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary for 
European Affairs and Benjamin Hulley of the Division of Northern European Affairs spoke 
with Dag Hammarskjöld and Swedish Ambassador to the United States Erik Boheman, and 
during this meeting “Mr. Hammarskjold said that limited technical cooperation [between 
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden] was of course going on but that for political reasons public 
announcements would necessarily take the line which the Swedish Ministers had followed in 
their speeches. Such cooperation was secret and there would be no announcement that is 
going on."9 Officially, Sweden continued to distance itself from the West; however, 
Hammarskjöld’s remarks convey that the Swedes found it natural to cooperate with their 
Nordic neighbors. This cooperation served to form early Swedish ties with the West while 
continuing to officially appear aloof.  
According to the Commission on Neutrality Policy (CNP), this cooperation fit into 
Swedish declaratory doctrine, for Prime Minister Erlander and Foreign Minister Unden gave 
speeches to the Riksdag that stated “when discussing neutrality in peacetime, one can only 
mean that a state, striving to remain outside a conflict in war, does not in peacetime restrict 
                                               
8 SOU 1994:11, 126-128, 137-147. 
9 Memorandum of Conversation between Hulley, Perkins, Hammarskjöld, and Boheman, November 
22, 1949, 2-3, in: Records of the U.S. Department of State RG 59, Records of the Office of British 
Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs BNA, 1941-1953, Subject Files SF, 1941-1953, South 
Africa, Union of, Policy - Sweden, External Political Affairs: U.S., Box No. 18 (Folder: External Political 
Affairs: Miscellaneous), NARA II, College Park, MD. 
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its freedom of action by entering alliance agreements that would render wartime neutrality 
impossible." The CNP deduced that these speeches left room for certain military cooperation 
in peacetime that was not an alliance; therefore, limited cooperation through DNS was 
possible.10 Past studies have proven that these speeches were more in-depth than the CNP 
claimed, and Unden’s speech “admitted that the general line of policy might give room for 
technical cooperation ‘on one point or another’ between the Scandinavian countries.” 
Erlander’s speech was more restrictive. Unden claimed that there was a list of cooperative 
measures that they could take, perhaps referring to the list presented to him by Swedlund, but 
“every one that saw that list would realize that there is so little to be gained by these 
measures, that it was not worth taking the great risk."11 
According to Swedlund, Erlander’s speech was made with the intention to conceal the 
DNS cooperation that was occurring; therefore, the government was actively hiding 
cooperation relating to security and defense that, according to statements by government 
officials, did not necessarily conform to Sweden’s policy of neutrality.12 Documents from the 
United States support Swedlund’s assessment, such as the conversation between Hulley, 
Perkins, Hammarskjöld, and Boheman. Proof that the government gave Swedlund the green-
light on several of the issues on the list is present. Unden contacted him with the decision that 
the government had approved five of the twelve items on the list; however, Unden specified 
that the government classified all preparations as secret. With this approval, DNS planning 
began in earnest by small groups of staff officers. The chiefs of the defense staff oversaw this 
work, and within four years of cabinet approval, they initiated four plans.13 
                                               
10 SOU 1994:11, 51. 
11 Robert Dalsjö, Life-Line Lost: The rise and fall of ‘neutral’ Sweden’s secret reserve option of 
wartime help from the West (Stockholm: Santerus Academic Press, 2006), 69. 
12 Nils Swedlund, Tjänstedagböcker, entry for 1 March 1950, point 7, Nils Swedlunds personarkiv, 
Krigsarkivet, Stockholm. 
13 Dalsjö, Life-Line Lost, 152. 
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As they conducted much of this work in the utmost secrecy, determining who knew 
what is difficult; however, this instance proves that Prime Minister Erlander, Foreign 
Minister Unden, Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs Dag Hammarskjöld, and the 
Ambassador of Sweden to the United States Erik Boheman knew what occurred. While 
Swedlund and the United States’ memorandum mentions these four men by name, others 
knew too. Swedlund had pitched the original idea to the cabinet; therefore, all the members of 
the 1949 cabinet were in the know. Furthermore, in relaying to Swedlund that the government 
approved his parts of his plan, Unden mentioned that he had informed Utrikesnämnden, the 
council on foreign affairs.14 Therefore, the government, although declaring otherwise, 
condoned the cooperation that was occurring.  
The fact that so many upper-level government officials were willing to all conceal this 
cooperation proves that the government was purposefully creating two strands of policy. 
Their goal in maintaining this double game was to keep up the appearance of neutrality for 
the sake of the Soviets and the Swedish public, to whom neutrality had become a moral 
dogma of which Sweden must follow, while secretly leaning towards the West to ensure that 
Swedish neutrality would be a safe policy to follow. By hiding this Western lean, Sweden 
could work towards procuring American military technology to sustain a strong Swedish 
defensive military position, overcoming their insecurity; however, the bigger picture was that 
Sweden was displaying a willingness to support American objectives in their area. By having 
such a willingness, Sweden would be able to rely on American military assistance in the 
event of a Soviet invasion, and this becomes apparent in Sweden’s constant mentioning of 
help from abroad in defense and security planning.  
                                               
14 SOU 1994:11, 138. 
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The Swedish government’s 1950 declaration of foreign policy contained a segment 
aimed to answer the question of peacetime cooperation between Sweden and its Scandinavian 
neighbors. The statement read: 
 
With regard to this question, the government has on several occasions responded that 
we cannot enter into cooperation that has the effect of compromising our declared 
policy of neutrality. Those who advocated technical military cooperation may mean 
totally different things, which the public debate shows. But each and every one 
knows, that when technical military cooperation is discussed, one thinks foremost of 
such forms of cooperation as combined staff talks and combined defense planning and 
implications thereof, i.e. exactly the kind of cooperation that in its political purport 
comes close to a defense union and which - if accepted in Sweden vis-a-vis Denmark 
and Norway - would to a great extent have the effect of compromising Sweden’s 
stated policy of neutrality. Since Denmark and Norway have acceded to the Atlantic 
Pact, such military technical cooperation with them would be tantamount to an 
indirect engagement in the greater compact created by the Atlantic Pact. The Swedish 
cabinet therefore finds such technical cooperation inconsistent with the policy adopted 
by the government.15 
 
This statement contains the implication that Swedish neutrality policy prohibited 
technical military cooperation with Norway and Denmark; however, upon a closer inspection, 
Unden placed a carefully worded loophole in the end of the statement. Namely, that it only 
prohibited combined staff talks, and defense planning if it came to resemble a defense union. 
All the instances of “military technical cooperation” that appeared after this phrasing 
included “such”; thus, all statements of “such military technical cooperation” referred to 
military cooperation that resembled a defense union. This clever loophole enabled Sweden to 
conduct military cooperation with Norway and Denmark on a lesser level.  
Unden devised this loophole so brilliantly that he had to explain it to the leaders of the 
opposing non-socialist parties, for they disapproved of the statement, believing that the 
government was prohibiting all military cooperation. He explained that the statement used the 
example of such military cooperation as that which appears to be a defense union; therefore, 
                                               
15 Utrikesfrågor: Offentliga dokument mm rörande viktigare svenska utrikesfrågor 1950–1951, 
Aktstycken utgivna av Utrikesdepartementet. Ny serie. I:C (Stockholm: Kungl. Utrikesdepartementet, 
1952 –), 13; SOU 1994:11, 52. 
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they, “did not mention other possible cases, which had to be judged on a case-by-case 
basis."16 Further evidence exists for the case that it was the government’s intention to create 
the illusion of an official hardline to hide military cooperation with Norway and Denmark, 
for Erlander wrote in his diary that, “Hjalmarson [was] here for a discussion about Nordic 
defense issues before the foreign policy debate on Wednesday. Apparently, he is not against 
the creation of a smoke screen that can preserve unity."17 Therefore, the government, which 
had given Swedlund approval for DNS planning, acted in accordance with official policies, 
for they masked the potential for limited cooperation through a loophole in declaratory 
doctrine.  
The loophole allowed contacts to continue creating the foundations of cooperative 
planning, and the Swedes were already creating multilateral plans through DNS. 
Furthermore, the Swedes made plans for the reception of war material from the West in war 
time, for keeping “the gateway to the West open for receiving supplies is one of the key 
elements of our [Swedish] strategy."18 A key idea behind the Swedish policy was that while 
attempting to avoid being drawn into a war, if war were to break out they would be 
supporting the West. Norway was the intended gateway for incoming supplies from the West, 
and, in the early to mid-1950s, Sweden and Norway began planning to construct a port on the 
Norwegian west coast equipped with facilities to store material, namely oil.19 Building began 
on such a facility near Trondheim. 
While Sweden was looking to secure assurances for wartime imports, they also sought 
to procure modern military equipment from the United States in peacetime; however, the 
United States, displeased with the Swedish attempt to draw Norway and Denmark away from 
                                               
16 Östen Unden, Anteckningar 1918 - 1952, Utgivna genom Karl Molin, Handlingar del 24, 
(Stockholm: Kungl. Samfundet för utgivande av handskrifter rörande Skandinaviens historia 2002), 
309. 
17 Tage Erlander and Sven Erlander, Dagböcker 1950–1951 (Stockholm: Gidlund, 2001) 66–67. 
18 SOU 1994:11, 228. 
19 SOU 1994:11, 124-125. 
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the West with the SDU and their strict adherence to their policy of neutrality, denied export 
permits. As described in NSC 28/1, the United States wanted Sweden to lean toward the 
West; however, they did not set Swedish membership in Western military alliance as a goal. 
In a memorandum to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, James Lay, 
Jr., James Webb, the Assistant Secretary of State reviewed that NSC 28/1’s goals for Norway 
and Denmark had been satisfied after their accession to membership in NATO; however, the 
goals for Sweden had not been met. When discussing armament sales Webb stated, “[w]e 
propose no modification of the present policy of having Sweden to go to the end of the line 
for arms, but after this condition [NSC 28/1’s goal for Sweden] is met there should be 
sufficient leeway to permit commercial exports of military equipment.”20 Therefore, once 
Sweden made an astute assurance to the United States of their Western alignment, they would 
proceed with sales of military equipment.  
 One episode contains the core of this American outlook. In late 1949, Sweden 
purchased twenty sets of Bendix radars for the cost of one-million USD, and the Swedes had 
to appeal to the United States government to obtain export permits.21 The United States 
Department of State wanted to grant these permits, and as stated by Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson, “we are inclined to weigh heavily [the] fact Norway desires radar net in [Sweden] 
for defense of [Norway] regardless of [the] accuracy of [Norway’s] estimate of its 
importance. Our understanding is that equipment covered by [the] present application 
involves no problem of release of classified material, and so far as we are aware is not desired 
                                               
20 Memorandum to James S. Lay, Jr., from James Webb, November 14, 1950, 1-2, Records of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff RG 218, Central Decimal File 1948-1950; 381 (10-2-46) B.P. Pt. 2 to 381 (8-14-
47) Sec. 3; Box No. 184, (Folder: Defense of Scandinavia (Norway, Denmark, and Sweden); Nara II, 
College Park, MD. 
21 Letter from Boheman to Lagerfelt, december 1, 1949, 1 - 2, in: HP 24 V1/U.S. A, “Tillstånd till in- 
och utförsel av vapen, ammunition och krigsmateriel,” 1946 okt., - aug. 1952, Folder 20; Box No. 
1353, År 1946 – 1952, Riksarkivet, Stockholm. 
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by NAT members”; thus, the State Department was inclined to approve the application to 
appease Norwegian desires.22 
  The Swedes had already made an appeal for the exportation of such technology a 
year prior, for in the meeting that took place between Perkins, Hulley, Boheman, and 
Hammarskjöld, the two Swedes broached the subject of purchasing American military 
technology after disclosing to the Americans that they were conducting limited military 
cooperation with the Norwegians and Danes. The two were likely attempting to convince the 
Americans that Sweden would aid the NATO member nations in the defense of Scandinavia 
against a Soviet attack, and Ambassador Boheman stated that “the difficult problem for 
Sweden as a country outside the group [NATO] would be to keep abreast of technical 
developments. He hoped that when the Swedes tried to buy military supplies here [the United 
States] it would be possible for them to do so.”23 Furthermore, Boheman made an assurance 
to the United States that the Swedes would overlook peacetime Western overflights as they 
were to be expected.24  
This is yet another example of Sweden’s policy to lean towards the West, for they 
were expecting Western overflights to occur and were willing to accommodate them. While 
there was not an official agreement to cement this, and it would come under scrutiny in the 
years to follow, it displays the unspoken, covert cooperation that Sweden was willing to 
undertake to support the West.  A year earlier, two first secretaries at the Swedish Embassy 
met with the State Department, and they expressed that, in wartime, Sweden would also 
                                               
22 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Volume III, Western Europe, eds. David H. Stauffer, 
et al. (Washington.: US Government Printing Office, 1977), Document 16. 
23 Memorandum of Conversation between Hulley, Perkins, Hammarskjöld, and Boheman, November 
22, 1949, 2-3, in: RG 59; Records of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European 
Affairs (BNA), 1941-1953; Subject Files (SF), 1941-1953; South Africa, Union of, Policy - Sweden, 
External Political Affairs: U.S.; Box No. 18 (Folder: External Political Affairs: Miscellaneous); NARA II, 
College Park, MD. 
24 Memorandum of Conversation between Hulley, Perkins, and Boheman April 18, 1950, in: RG 59; 
BNA, 1941 – 1953; SF, 1941 – 1953; South Africa, Union of Policy – Sweden, External Political 
Affairs: U.S.; Box No. 18; (Folder: External Political Affairs: U.S.); NARA II, College Park, MD. 
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allow Western overflights.25 This statement supports an earlier statement by Chief of the 
Swedish Air Staff, General Nordenskiöld, for he had made an assurance that Unden and 
Minister of Defense Alan Vougt both knew and approved of Western overflights in 
wartime.26 
After review from the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff determined 
that export licenses to Sweden for the radar should be denied, for ”items of a technological 
nature which, if made available to enemy technicians, would enhance the enemy’s military 
knowledge or techniques.”27 Therefore, the export licenses were not approved; however, the 
Swedes had already paid for the radar sets. To remedy this, the United States had to create a 
reason to justify the denial, and after justifying the denial, they could purchase the radar sets 
from Sweden. The solution presented itself through the Mutual Defense Assistance program. 
This program allowed the United States, which had no personal use for the radar sets, to 
justify withholding them from the Swedes by claiming that NATO member countries 
required them for their own security.  
This is evident in a letter to Ambassador Matthews from Bonbright in the State 
Department Office of European Affairs, for Bonbright proposed to tell the Swedes, “in view 
of [the] present international situation, including its obvious effect upon the supply situation, 
no assurances can be given that a license would be issued for replacements [radar sets] at a 
later date. . . .We know the Swedish Government, in this connection, will appreciate our 
obligation towards the countries which have entered into defense agreements with us.”28 
Bonbright was making a statement regarding Sweden’s neutrality policy by making the final 
                                               
25 SOU 1994:11, 148 – 149. 
26 Memorandum of Conversation between Hardy and Nordenskiöld, July 8, 1948, 1, in: RG 59, BNA, 
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remark about the obligation of the United States towards NATO member nations. This is 
clearly an instance of the United States putting pressure on Sweden to align closer to the 
West, for Secretary of State Acheson had told Ambassador Matthews that the radar sets were 
not “desired by NAT members.”29 Therefore, the statement Bonbright formulated was 
deceitful with the intention to manipulate Swedish posture closer to the West.  
   Until the Swedes made a firm assurance that they aligned with the West, the 
Americans would continue to deny export permits, and the Economic Cooperation 
Administration, tasked with conducting the Marshall Plan, Mission Chief to Sweden, John 
Haskell, suggested that the United States should continue to deny exports to Sweden that 
would be denied to the East since the “Swedes [had] not yet signified their intention to 
cooperate in restriction of exports to east.”30 In response, the Swedes acquiesced to the 
American terms of the Consultative Group and the Coordinating Committee (COCOM), 
which began operating in 1950. They decided to modify the application of the word 
contraband; therefore, in accordance with Swedish law, they could not re-export contraband 
strategic imports to the East.31  
This matter of semantics proved to fall short of American expectations, for U.S. 
Ambassador to Sweden William Butterworth approached Dag Hammarskjöld to convey the 
message that the United States needed an improved assurance against re-exportation.32 This 
situation depicts a central issue standing between the Swedes and the United States. The 
Swedes had a desire to align with the West based on their ideological similarities and need 
for advanced military technology to quench Swedish insecurities about its ability to uphold 
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its neutrality; however, the United States was unwilling to simply accept an unspoken or 
semantically bound cooperation. The Swedes, and to an extent the U.S., had to modify their 
objectives to reach a balance that two found agreeable for continued cooperation. 
While Sweden, apt to adhere to its neutrality policy, was not willing to formally 
accept the terms put forth by COCOM, the government authorized Hammarskjöld to come to 
a more informal agreement. He and Ambassador Butterworth began working with one 
another to form an agreement that both parties found satisfactory. Shortly after this bilateral 
process began, in May 1951, the United States approved the export permits of the Bendix 
radar stations.33 Hammarskjöld and Butterworth reached an agreement on June 15, 1951, and 
the two signed Stockholmsöverenskommelsen, the Stockholm Agreement. The Stockholm 
Agreement dictated that Sweden should refrain from exporting the goods listed by COCOM, 
when it was possible, to the East.34 As this agreement was finalized shortly after the 
exportation of the Bendix radars was approved, it follows that the negotiations were going 
favorably and the United States was beginning to lighten the pressure on Sweden; however, 
this cooperation in trade was in danger of halting unless the Swedes abided stringently by the 
trade guidelines made by the United States. 35  This deliberation required the establishment of 
a special committee, the Coordinating Committee for East - West Trade, and Sweden argued 
that, based on tradition, they would not export or re-export war material to the Soviets. 36 
The United States was satisfied for a brief period; however, they ultimately did not 
find this reassurance agreeable either. Therefore, the Swedes offered a compromise. They 
would not officially adhere to the policy the United States put forward; however, they would 
undertake “to inform the United States of any possible departures from this policy.”37 The 
United States found this to be an agreeable arrangement. In January 1952, the United States 
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produced a new policy paper on Scandinavia, NSC 121. According to this document, the 
United States realized that “although on balance, and primarily because of the advantage to 
the organization of Scandinavian defense, it would be to our interest to have Sweden in 
NATO, we must for the predictable future accept as a political fact Sweden’s policy of 
avoiding great power military alliances”; therefore, the United States policy remained 
generally unchanged from NSC 28/1 in 1948.38 The notable changes are that it is explicitly 
stated that Sweden’s accession to NATO membership would serve United States interests, 
although this was not set as a policy goal, and that Swedish neutrality was to be accepted as a 
fact. Previously, the United States, although recognizing Swedish neutrality, aimed to sway 
Sweden from this policy as if it were not an indomitable fact. 
In February 1952, the United States granted the Swedes eligibility to acquire United 
States military equipment export permits adhering to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act 
(MDAA) of 1949.39 As this arrangement was based on the MDAA, Sweden, as a recipient 
country, had to “provide the United States with certain reassurances”; thus, Sweden had to 
agree to the terms of the MDAA.40  
The Swedes, unaware of the nature of these reassurances, requested that they receive 
a draft, and they received this draft on 1 April 1952. The Swedes proposed several changes to 
the draft. They found mention of the MDAA to be problematic, for, they “judged that if such 
reassurances were to include references to U.S. legislation, they might compromise Sweden’s 
policy of non-alignment.”41 Furthermore, the first article stated that Sweden would agree “to 
furnish equipment and materials, services, or other assistances, consistent with the Charter of 
the United Nations, to the United States or to and among other nations eligible for assistance 
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under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act to further the policies and purpose of this Act.”42 
Sweden found this to be troublesome, for it required them to agree to aid other nations in 
accordance with the MDAA. Sweden’s neutrality policy was incompatible with Article 2 of 
the draft too, for it stated that Sweden was “to participate in the defense of the area in which 
it is a part.”43 Butterworth relayed the changes that Sweden proposed to Acheson.44 
 Four days later, Butterworth cabled Acheson again to detail how he believed the 
Swedes would be most receptive of Western aid, and he found that cooperation should 
 
be carried out with secrecy and at least tacit consent of Swed Govt. . . .The final 
recommendation in my [dispatch] 1227 of June 15, 1951 stated that: ‘The US (and 
SHAPE) [should] consider encouraging the Nor and Dan Govts to cooperate, or even 
invite, Swed overtures re joint planning and strategy. . .Swed is likely to prefer that all 
such planning be arranged on a clandestine basis and wld be more likely to respond 
favorable to the arrangements handled directly between Scandinavian mil 
[authorities].’45  
 
Therefore, Butterworth reasoned that planning with the West should be facilitated 
through Norway to make it more palatable to the Swedish government; thus, the “Swedes 
[will] find that they can extend the degree of covert coop with Nor[way] without leaks or 
public repercussions they will cease to be fearful of dealing with Nor[way] acting, as she 
gradually will be, as the agent of NATO.”46 As it will be shown later, Butterworth’s 
description is reflected in the actions that would later be taken by Sweden, Norway, and 
NATO. The American response to the Swedish revisions came nearly a week later, on 6 May 
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1952, and they had made the amendments to remove mention of the MDAA and the clause 
regarding defending the area in which Sweden is a part. They substituted any mention of the 
MDAA with the phrase this agreement; therefore, while the appearance of the document had 
changed, the underlying meaning persisted as both parties knew which agreement the note 
referred to. 
The phrasing in Article 1 regarding Sweden aiding other countries in accordance with 
the MDAA had remained unchanged except for replacing the MDAA with this agreement. 
The Swedes believed that they could secure further changes to the draft. They sent a new 
draft to the Americans, and in this draft, they had removed the phrase in article 1. On 13 June 
1952, the Swedes received word that the United States accepted their new proposal, and the 
exchange of notes occurred seventeen days later.47 Foreign Minister Unden signed the 
Swedish note, and the Americans replied with a brief note signed by Ambassador 
Butterworth on 1 July 1952.48 This exchange of notes represents the U.S. and Sweden finally 
finding a mutually agreeable balance of commitment, for the Swedes were willing to lean 
further towards the West to secure United States technological support. The Swedes were 
willing to give way to the Americans to receive such support, for it was vital for Sweden to 
obtain advanced technology to maintain its ability to uphold its neutrality.  
In later 1952, NATO released a new policy document, MC 14/1. The North Atlantic 
Military Committee approved this on 9 December 1952, and it addressed issues pertaining to 
NATO’s defense of Scandinavia. The committee found that any defense of Scandinavia must 
take Sweden into consideration, for “it [was] clear that Scandinavia must be defended as a 
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whole.”49 They also declared that Scandinavian defense plans “should be based on the need 
for the utmost flexibility, to permit concentration to deal with surprise attacks before they can 
be reinforced”; however, they realized that Sweden would likely, “remain neutral unless 
attacked.”50 Despite the advances made in the early 1950s, this cooperation was slow and did 
not produce any immediate results for the Swedes. 
The link that formed between Sweden and Norway served as a channel for 
cooperation between Sweden and NATO after the establishment of AFNORTH, NATO’s 
northern command, in September 1951. The military leaders of Sweden and NATO realized 
the importance of working with one another in the event of war, and in May 1952 the 
Swedish government authorized the defense staff to establish a link with AFNORTH through 
the Norwegian and Danish defense staffs. Four months later, the Norwegian chief of defense 
staff, Berg, replied to a request from Swedlund to “dispatch a small group of Norwegian 
army officers to Sweden to discuss certain aspects of possible combined Norwegian - 
Swedish planning," and in his reply, he suggested that this contingent should include some 
officers from AFNORTH’s staff. Swedlund agreed to this; thus, they had established contacts 
between Sweden and NATO by 1952.51  
The period of 1949 - 1952 was a period of foundation for security cooperation 
initiatives. Bilateral planning began in 1949 at the behest of Swedlund; however, Erlander 
and Unden, along with the entire cabinet and the council on foreign affairs, were in the know 
as they gave him approval to carry out such DNS planning. The failure of the formation of an 
SDU, from United States pressure, forced Swedish officials to evaluate their neutrality 
policy, and the Swedish government placed a cleverly hidden caveat to allow for cooperation, 
such as DNS, to be in harmony with declaratory doctrine in their neutrality policy in 1950.  
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The United States applied pressure to the Swedes regarding the procurement of war 
material, which was vital to Sweden for overcoming insecurity and reinforcing neutrality, and 
in accordance to the American policy goals set forth in NSC 28/1 in 1948, set forth to receive 
an assurance that Sweden leaned to the west. Such an assurance, which occurred as an 
exchange of notes, took four years to receive, for Sweden was unwilling to completely turn 
away from the morality aspect of their neutrality in exchange for shoring up their insecurities. 
In those four years, the United States updated its policy in a new paper, NSC 121, which 
largely remained unchanged from NSC 28/1 except for the mention that it would be in 
American interests to have Sweden as a member of NATO. Sweden began working with 
NATO through Norway and AFNORTH through personal contracts, which would prove to 
continue to evolve throughout the next few decades; thus, the pressure exerted by the United 
















The Intensified Period of Cooperation 1953 – 1979  
In 1953 Sweden and NATO had further worked out the terms of the arrangement 
between AFNORTH and Sweden, for NATO commanders had decided to perform all 
communications with Sweden through Norway. Berg, Swedlund’s Norwegian counterpart, 
informed Swedlund of this in October 1953.  Swedlund relayed this information to the Prime, 
Defense, and Interior Ministers, and Erlander noted in his diary that he approved of this 
structure.52 The government had approved all of this, and it fit within the declaratory doctrine 
laid out in 1950. While military cooperation occurred through DNS, with limited cooperation 
with NATO through AFNORTH and Norway, Sweden also sought to cooperate logistically 
with NATO. They channeled this cooperation through the Off-Shore Procurement Program 
(OSP) of the United States. The purpose of the OSP was to procure military equipment from 
countries participating in the MDAA; therefore, Sweden had become eligible for the OSP 
after the exchange of notes that occurred in 1952. 
Sweden displayed an interest in becoming an OSP contractor, and they facilitated the 
establishment of contracts through Sveriges Allmänna Exportförening, which was an 
organization dedicated to expanding markets for Swedish manufacturers. Sweden was 
certainly interested in obtaining OSP contracts as a lucrative means of income; however, it 
was also a way for Sweden to show the West that they were willing to cooperate further with 
the United States and NATO. It appears the United States did not award Sweden with many 
contracts, for Secretary of State John Foster Dulles informed the United States embassy in 
Stockholm that “it is unlikely that Sweden will receive any contracts except where justified 
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by compelling reasons.”53 The decision to deny Sweden OSP contracts was more of a 
pressure move than one displaying U.S. wariness, for the U.S. could have been able to secure 
further concessions from Sweden, regarding a further Western lean, if they denied Sweden 
the economic boost that OSP contracts would bring.  
While the Swedes were displaying their will to cooperate with NATO through the 
OSP, they began to reach out to the Americans for missile technology, for their insecurity 
remained at the forefront of their neutrality policy. In 1954, Ambassador Boheman 
approached Allen Dulles, the Director of the CIA, to appeal for technical cooperation 
between Sweden and the United States on guided missile technology. Boheman appealed to 
the security interests of the United States, for he claimed that such cooperation would greatly 
improve Sweden’s ability to defend itself, which he conjectured was an American interest.54 
As laid out by NATO in MC 14/1 two years prior, Boheman was correct, for NATO, and by 
extension the United States, favored a strong Swedish defense to help defend Scandinavia as 
a whole. 
Despite this appeal, the Americans continued to withhold guided missile information 
from the Swedes. Several months later, the JCS found that it was “in the interest of the 
overall security and defense of the United States” to continue to restrict guided missile 
information, perhaps signifying distrust of the Swedish ability to keep the information out of 
the hands of America’s enemies.55 NATO released a new policy document, MC 48, in 
December 1954, and it placed a major focus on the air defense of Europe. It was iterated that, 
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as the air defenses that existed in Europe at the time of the report were inadequate, the current 
air defense placements would have to be “supplemented by adequate passive defense 
preparations.”56 As Sweden continued to work to secure guided missile technology, they also 
began to prepare for further cooperation with NATO in event of a conflict, for the Swedes 
realized that, without the advantage of advanced American military technology, they were no 
longer able to uphold their neutrality by defending themselves without outside assistance.  
The Swedish Defense Committee mentioned that Sweden would aid the West in an 
East – West conflict by prompting “the East to avoid overflights of Sweden”; therefore, the 
Soviets would be forced to fly into a “concentration of Western air defences.”57 In 1957, the 
Swedish Air Force simulated an attack from the East, and the exercise consisted of NATO air 
units assisting in Sweden’s defense. The NATO forces “spoke English, gave speeds and 
heights in knots and feet, and their Anglicized pronunciation of names of Swedish cities gave 
the controllers a bit of realism”; thus, Sweden had prepared to work with NATO terminology 
in air control.58 
Official policy generally remained unchanged until 1959; however, there are two 
standout moments in 1954 and 1957. The Supreme Commander, ÖB Swedlund, made a 
statement in 1954 that included a mention of relying on external help in the event of war. 
This reliance came from a lack of resources; therefore, Swedlund determined that “strategy 
must focus on creating preconditions, such that we in war could be supported by states in 
whose interests it would be to assist us." The following year’s defense committee reflected 
this statement, for they placed a focus on external assistance believing that Western 
assistance would be forthcoming in war time.59  
                                               
56 Gregory W. Pedlow, NATO Strategy documents 1949 – 1969 (n.p.: NATO, 1997), 233. 
57 SOU 1994:11, 83. 
58 Paul Cole, Sweden Without the Bomb: The Conduct of a Nuclear-Capable Nation Without Nuclear 
Weapons (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1994), 73. 
59 SOU 1994:11, 82–85. 
Byrne 27 
Swedlund reinforced this in 1957 when the Minister of Defense tasked him with 
producing a planning document. This document, again, suggested that external assistance was 
a necessity in war; however, it went further by asserting that “for the military assistance to be 
effective, general strategic concerns and opportunities will in the end be decisive. It is an 
obvious advantage, however, if the assistance has been prepared already in peacetime. Since 
our policy on non-participation in alliance inter alia means that no such preparations can be 
made, we must adapt accordingly so that we can make do without this advantage."60 
While adhering to neutrality, Sweden could not join the forming European 
Community (EC). If Sweden was to join an organization such as the EC, it would have 
difficulty in reassuring others of the reliability of their neutrality policy; therefore, they did 
not take part in the formation of the EC in 1958. Although they could not partake in the EC, 
they did find the British proposal of a European Free Trade Association to be an agreeable 
alternative. In 1959, several European states that did not partake in the EC legitimized the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) as they signed the Stockholm Convention.61 Unlike 
the EC, the EFTA did not interfere with the credibility of Swedish neutrality, for it did not 
have a rigid structure of intergovernmental relations in which the organization maintained a 
higher status than the nations in it.62 Therefore, as with security strategy, Sweden was keen 
on maintaining freedom of action and non-alignment by avoiding the EC through the EFTA. 
After the failure of the SDU talks to this point, Sweden’s policy of neutrality was 
based on deterrence; therefore, a strong Swedish military served as the guarantee of the 
success of the security policy. This continued to be the case until 1959 when the Hjalmarson 
affair occurred. The Hjalmarson affair consisted of the leader of the Conservative party - Jarl 
Hjalmarson - and his associates accusing the Erlander / Unden Social Democratic (SAP) 
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government of being overtly appeasing to the Soviet Union while claiming that Swedish 
values identified with western values. These claims led Nikita Khrushchev to cancel a trip to 
Sweden, for the Swedish government did nothing to counter such claims against him. This 
allowed the SAP to expel Jarl Hjalmarson from the Swedish entourage to the United Nations, 
and Erlander proceeded to give speeches that declared the statements of Hjalmarson as being 
incompatible with Sweden’s policy of neutrality.63  
The importance of this affair cannot be stressed enough regarding its effects on 
Swedish security and defense policy, for it was unprecedented in how it modified policy. 
Sweden’s policy of neutrality had traditionally been successful owing to the strong Swedish 
military presence behind it; therefore, it had been a neutrality policy of deterrence. It should 
be noted that nuclear technology undermined this deterrence following the Second World 
War; however, the threat of an opposing bloc responding to a nuclear strike against Sweden 
with its own nuclear strike is a possible reason deterrence continued to work for Sweden to 
this point. In the wake of this affair - more precisely, Erlander’s statements - Sweden’s policy 
of neutrality was transformed into one of assurance, for it was made clear that it was more 
important to the SAP government to assure the Soviets that they were not a threat than it was 
to ensure and make it known that they could defend themselves from a Soviet threat. 
In his speech to Parliament, Erlander expressed that Sweden must maintain a high 
level of credibility in its neutrality policy. He stated that “others should be able to trust our 
assurances that freedom from alliances in peacetime means that we will maintain neutrality in 
the event of war." In accordance with this, military cooperation and preparations were not 
possible. This was a restriction in declaratory doctrine from the 1950 stance, for the new 
policy did not include the previous loophole. Erlander stated that “preparations and 
consultations for military cooperation with members of a great power military alliance are 
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therefore categorically out of the question, if we wish to uphold trust in our foreign and 
defense policy”; thus, the work of Swedlund and DNS planning did not comply with the new 
Swedish neutrality policy.64  
The CNP has decided that Erlander’s statement “conveyed a deliberately erroneous 
picture of what had actually occurred," and they dismissed it as unable to be classified as 
declared doctrine.65 Several historians have pointed out this is an incorrect assessment, for 
Erlander had used similar phrasing in later speeches given in Stockholm and Uppsala that 
were made prior to the speech to Parliament. These speeches included the phrasing 
“‘preparations and discussions for military cooperation with members of a great power 
military alliance are therefore out of the question”’.66 Erlander’s statement to Parliament also 
addressed help from abroad, and in contrast to what was actually planned according to the 
statement from ÖB in 1957, he denied that relying on external help was compatible with 
neutrality policy and was not involved in current plans.67 Overall, the major changes that 
occurred to declared Swedish security policy were: neutrality based on deterrence through 
military might was replaced with a policy based on assurance; and preparations and military 
cooperation were out of the question with no loophole to exploit. 
While declaratory doctrine had undergone massive changes in terms of how 
restrictive neutrality policy appeared, preparations continued as they had under the laxer 1950 
declaration. Erlander’s statements that changed declared policy in 1959 did cause concern 
abroad about the continuation of preparations and cooperation; however, the Swedes quickly 
dealt out reassurances. In the case of the Danes, Curt Göransson, the Chief of the Swedish 
Defense Staff, attended secret meetings with Danish defense staff where he assured them 
“that the Swedish cabinet had given authorization to continue DNS-cooperation as before, 
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despite public statements to the contrary."68 The Swedes were able to continue their policy 
regarding the West by divorcing it from their official policy of an assurance-oriented 
neutrality with the Soviets, for the assurance policy was clearly aimed at the Soviets. By 
having two independent policies, Sweden was able to act in such a way that would be 
contradictory of one policy while being in harmony with the other. 
In the early 1960s, previously secret DNS plans for cooperation were made public 
under a new organization called SveNorDa; thus, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark created a 
political cover for coordinated air exercises with one another.69  The primary motive behind 
this move was that it relieved the stress of secrecy on the Nordic governments, for these 
actions that they took under DNS were top secret. By going public with cooperation that they 
officially rationalized as public safety exercises instead of military exercises, the Nordic 
governments found a way to circumvent the fear of Soviet discovery of their cooperation. 
These flights disproved the CNP’s claim that Swedish air bases were not large enough for 
allied aircraft to operate from, and it proved that the Swedes could refuel and service NATO 
aircraft.70 Going public with SveNorDa also allowed the three nations to establish microwave 
links between flight control centers, and it facilitated Swedish use of ultra-high frequency 
band radio transceivers which allowed communication between Sweden and NATO 
operators.71 The standard language for communications within SveNorDa was English, and 
this led to Swedish Air Force staff becoming familiarized with NATO terminology that, as 
mentioned above, they had previously been introduced to in 1957.72 
Furthermore, the Swedes extended several of their airbase runways to accommodate 
the larger NATO planes. According to a radio interview from former Swedish Chief of the 
Defense Staff (1961 – 1967), General Carl Eric Almgren, these efforts affected ten Swedish 
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air bases. The purpose of these bases was for U.S. fighters and bomber recovery.73 The 
Swedes also made changes to the fueling procedures for domestic aircraft, for they switched 
to a new fuel, which happened to be a NATO standard. This switch of fuel accompanied a 
switch in fueling procedure. The Swedes adopted high-pressure fueling, and this required 
new fuel nozzles. The new fuel nozzles that the Swedes made standard happened to be “better 
adapted to NATO standard” too.74  Therefore, during the 1950s and early 1960s, Sweden 
undertook preparations to become more harmonious with NATO, and these steps that they 
took, which were preparations for the reception of outside aid, were incompatible with the 
declared neutrality policy after the Hjalmarson affair in 1959. 
While Sweden was taking steps to become more receptive of outside aid by 
introducing NATO standards, they were not undertaking full standardization across the 
board; furthermore, they did not have any of the responsibilities of a full NATO member. 
Therefore, Sweden was far from an unofficial member of the alliance. Although their 
preparations were not as in-depth as NATO members, one should not overlook their actions, 
for they had taken some very significant steps that, since 1959, did not adhere to their official 
policy. Declaratory doctrine had evolved to be more restrictive; however, actual preparations 
taken had stayed the course since 1950. Therefore, their enacted policy had largely remained 
the same from the official doctrine in 1950 throughout the 1950s into the 1960s. 
The Swedes finally reached a breakthrough for American guided missile procurement 
in 1959. Torstein Rapp, ÖB at the time, visited the United States to discuss the arrangement 
with the United States Navy, and on 17 February 1959, Rapp and United States Admiral 
Arleigh signed an agreement for the purchase of 2,000 Sidewinder missiles.75 With this 
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acquisition, combined with the planning through DNS, Sweden had shored up its defensive 
capability considerably and alleviated most of its insecurities from the immediate post-war 
period; therefore, the Swedes were able to make the transition from deterrence to assurance in 
relation to their Soviet policy as mentioned above. This was able to take place, for the 
Swedes, no longer in need of placing their insecurity so high, modified the balance of 
insecurity and morality in their neutrality policy to a more even level.  
Aside from securing technology, they also completed building the facility for the 
reception of war material from the West near Trondheim, Norway in 1962. They built two 
facilities. One was for the reception of goods, in Murvik, and the other was a distribution 
center in Hell. The most important part of this facility, for the Swedes, was the oil storage 
capabilities. They had “a total storage capacity of 50,000 cubic meters,” and the two facilities 
were connected “by an underground oil pipeline.”76 The costs for procuring and storing the 
large quantities of fuel turned out to be more than the Swedes could handle; therefore, they 
offered Norwegian oil companies the use “the use of the facility, and they later leased two-
thirds of it.”77 
1965 marked the end of Sweden’s declaratory plans to resist an attack until outside 
help arrived, for a statement from ÖB, like the ones from 1954 and 1957, stressed that 
Sweden could not successfully defend against an attack from a great-power. This displays 
that Sweden understood its relative weakness compared to the great powers, and it is apparent 
that the goal Sweden had in mind when introducing the policy was to assure the Soviets of its 
non-threatening nature while working to tie themselves closer to NATO to ensure that 
Sweden would be properly defended in the event of war. Furthermore, he mentioned that 
Swedish defense policy, in the event of an attack, relied on their ability to “resist such an 
attack for such a long period, and that this defence can be conducted in such a way, that 
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various kinds of intervention on our behalf can take effect.”78 This was the final time that this 
policy, defending until help arrives, appeared in Swedish declaratory doctrine. In fact, the 
Defense Committee rebuked this in their statement in 1968, three years later, for they found 
that help from abroad was only compatible with Swedish neutrality policy if they 
concentrated their resources “on a stubborn defence to defend our freedom to the utmost.”79 
Therefore, if Sweden was to partake in peacetime arrangements for help from abroad, it 
would violate the neutrality policy. 
While Unden was minister of foreign affairs, 1945 – 1962 official Swedish policy had 
become more restrictive in terms of security and defense cooperation with other nations, 
primarily after the Hjalmarson affair in 1959.  He removed the loophole implemented in the 
1950 policy statement; thus, there was no longer a path for peacetime defense planning with 
others to be compatible with Swedish doctrine. Torstein Nilsson, Unden’s successor, largely 
maintained the doctrine he inherited. He advocated for solidifying the credibility of Swedish 
neutrality; however, the security declaration in 1968 left out the bit about “cooperation with 
members of a great power military alliance” being “categorically out of the question.”80 This 
cannot be counted as walking doctrine back to that of 1950, for a loophole was still not 
included; however, for a brief period, outright denial of cooperation being compatible with 
neutrality was absent. This period proved to be short, for it reappeared two years later.  
Unden’s departure from the foreign ministry also marked a shift from a reserved 
policy to what Nilsson dubbed an “active foreign policy” in 1963, and coinciding with the 
beginning of such a policy, Olof Palme became increasingly outspoken against the United 
States.81 As it had been possible for Sweden to shift from deterrence to assurance owing to 
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the modified, more equal balance between morality and insecurity in their neutrality policy, 
Palme became outspoken as he modified the balance to favor morality over insecurity. In 
1965, Palme entered the fray with a speech on Vietnam. Prior to this, the Swedish stance was 
that they could “only appeal to all the powers involved not to fail to take any opportunity for 
negotiation and reconciliation”; however, Palme’s speech departed from this as he criticized 
the involvement of the United States in the conflict.82 Palme later gave another speech in 
1968 during a rally for Vietnam organized by the SAP, and this speech reinforced Swedish 
support for North Vietnam while characterizing the United States as the unwanted interloper. 
They sent a message to the United States – to withdrawal from Vietnam.83  
This upset the United States enough to cause them to withdraw their ambassador; 
furthermore, SAP’s opposition in Sweden berated the Swedish government for siding with 
North Vietnam. They argued that it was not compatible with Swedish neutrality to take such a 
stance with a country that was at war, and they claimed that the government was doing this as 
a political move in preparations for the next election.84 The government doubled down on its 
efforts and continued to support North Vietnam. In 1969 Sweden recognized North Vietnam 
and offered them financial aid amounting to 40 million USD.85 
Palme succeeded Erlander in 1969 as prime minister and head of the SAP, and in 
1970 he delivered his first speech on security. He continued to reinforce the idea that Swedish 
neutrality should be based on a foundation of trust. He also stated that Sweden should be able 
to, “repel intrusions on Swedish territory, proceed against overflights, [and] protect our 
territorial waters and our harbors”; however, although he desired a strong Swedish defense, 
he found that “preparations and consultations for military cooperation with members of a 
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great power alliance are thus out of the question.”86 Nilsson left the foreign ministry in 1971, 
and his successor was Krister Wickman. Wickman made a speech that claimed that Sweden’s 
neutrality policy did not permit “the possibility of obtaining prepared assistance from outside 
powers in the event of an armed attack.” Policymakers reiterated this in 1972, asserting that 
“Sweden must abstain from preparing military assistance from outside powers in case of an 
armed attack.”87 
While Swedish declaratory doctrine was continuing to hold firm against cooperation 
with major power alliances, Palme continued to publicly criticize United States involvement 
in Vietnam. In December 1972, after the Linebacker II bombings began in Vietnam, Palme 
made a statement comparing the United States to Nazi Germany, for he said “bombings are 
an atrocity. There are many of those in modern history. They are usually connected to names 
– Guernica, Oradour, Babi Yar, Katyn, Lidice, Sharperville, Treblinka. Violence has 
triumphed. But the judgment of posterity has been harsh on those responsible. Now there is 
another name to add to the list – Hanoi, Christmas 1972.”88 The United States found this to 
be a highly offensive comparison, and diplomatic relations were shaken between the two 
nations. The United States informed the Swedes that the charge d’affaires would not be 
coming to Sweden; furthermore, they refused to accept the new Swedish ambassador. 
Diplomatic relations remained in this state for nearly a year and half. While Swedish 
opposition to the United States waned after the US signed the peace agreement with North 
Vietnam, Swedish outspokenness on foreign affairs remained.  
While diplomatic relations between Sweden and the United States suffered from 
Palme’s outspokenness, it would be logical to think that defense cooperation would have 
suffered too; however, according to Anders Thunborg, the State Secretary in the Ministry of 
Defense from 1970 – 1975, this was not the case. Thunborg told the CNP that “the 
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government had sanctioned that some preparations be made for wartime cooperation with 
NATO,” and he also pointed out that the outspoken critic against the United States, Palme, 
“had been fully informed.”89 Furthermore, though Palme’s actions caused a diplomatic rift 
between the United States and Sweden, he encouraged the military to cooperate with the 
United States to improve relations.90 Therefore, as was the case with Erlander, Unden, and 
Swedlund in the 1940s and 1950s, Swedish officials deliberately made misleading public 
statements expressing declaratory doctrine while their enacted policy held firm with the 
Western lean. Swedish policy continued to evolve with two diverging lines that were used to 
complement one another to secure strategic security goals with the United States while 
appearing to appease the Soviets. These two lines served both purposes behind Swedish 
neutrality, for their assurance oriented policy satisfied their moral component while the 
Western lean did the same for their insecurities.  
In 1973, the Swedish military leadership gave a report, and they reasoned that NATO 
would come to Sweden’s aid in the event of an attack from the Warsaw Pact. They argued 
that an attack on Sweden would continue to Norway and Denmark; therefore, NATO’s own 
interests would force their involvement. As a result of these findings, they suggested that “a 
large number of bases should be given freedom of action to receive assistance.”91 This proved 
to be one of the last mentions of help from abroad in Swedish defense planning, and 
according to the CNP, the final reference to help from abroad occurred in September 1977.92 
While this was a notable occurrence regarding semantics, it was not indicative of a change in 
policy, for reliance on the United States and Sweden’s Nordic neighbors continued to be a 
factor in Swedish security.  
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The active foreign policy proved to be a dominant factor in Sweden’s view of its 
position in the world, for they began, with the Vietnam War, to become involved in conflicts 
that had relatively little direct effect to themselves. In the time of Unden, Swedish policy 
followed his ideology of reservation and cautiousness, but with Palme’s rise to power, 
Sweden became increasingly outspoken and interventionist as a moral power. Declaratory 
doctrine continued to be relatively unchanged until the mid-1970s, for the SAP lost the 
election for the first time since the 1930s. This new government was a coalition government 
between the Center, Liberal, and Conservative parties. Torbjörn Fälldin was its leader.  
Upon gaining power, the coalition government had to reassure those in Sweden and 
abroad that they would uphold Sweden’s neutrality policy and active foreign policy. Their 
security and foreign policy statements reflect this; however, small changes are discernable in 
their policies. They reverted to a stance that Sweden took in the early 1950s, for they made 
note of their ideological alignment with the West and focused on the freedom of action that 
neutrality gave Sweden. They also valued a strong Swedish defense over an assurance-
oriented security policy. In 1979 the defense committee released its first report with a non-
socialist government; however, this report supported previous findings under the socialist 
regimes. They concluded that policy should remain generally unchanged, maintaining that 
military preparations and cooperation with other nations was incompatible with neutrality.93 
The committee also made an interesting comment on NATO and the Warsaw Pact. They 
noted that NATO formed through voluntary deliberations; whereas, the Warsaw Pact formed 
as a means for the Soviets to exert control over their border nations.94 This statement carried 
a very negative connotation for the Soviets while casting NATO in a positive light.  
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 It is apparent that the tumultuous relations between the United States and Sweden had 
a diplomatic impact; however, this chapter definitively shows that that it did not interfere 
with operational actions taken. While declaratory doctrine evolved enormously under this 
period, actions taken had remained generally the same. The Swedes built further relations 
with NATO, in accordance with the loophole in declaratory doctrine, in the 1950s, and this 
included: technological cooperation, such as guided missiles, not allowing Soviet overflights, 
and maintaining the policy of defense until external help arrives. All of these defensive 
advancements helped to curtail Sweden’s insecurities allowing for morality to move to the 
forefront of Swedish neutrality, and this is displayed by the changes in declaratory doctrine. 
A major change occurred in 1959 following the Hjalmarson affair. They removed the 
loophole included in 1950 from declaratory doctrine, and Swedish neutrality policy shifted 
from a basis of deterrence to assurance. Unden departed from an active role in government, 
and Palme rose to power. This marked a change in dynamic for Swedish foreign policy, for 
Palme enacted an active foreign policy that focused on morality in contrast to Unden’s 
cautious policy. This entailed harsh criticism of the United States during the Vietnam War. 
 Despite the changes in doctrine and Palme’s criticism, cooperation proceeded 
unhindered. Technological cooperation reached a breakthrough with the Swedish 
procurement of guided missiles in 1959, and they completed the reception facility at 
Trondheim for Western war material. DNS planning went public in the form of SveNorDa, 
effectively creating a political cover for the cooperation and training flights. Sweden 
extended several airstrips to accommodate NATO aircraft, and Sweden converted their 
aviation maintenance technology to fit a NATO standard. In summary, this period consisted 
of several changes at the doctrinal level; however, they maintained preparations and, in some 
cases, advanced them. This was largely owing to the growing military technological rift that 
Sweden faced with the great powers; therefore, the Swedes had to further cement their 
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association with the United States and the West to secure American military technology and 
Western aid in wartime. While extending a tether to the West, Sweden had to ensure that the 
Soviets did not view them as a threat; therefore, the Swedes, recognizing the fault that the 
technological gap had left in their deterrence-based neutrality, altered their policy in respect 
to the Soviets to be one of assurance. This alteration, combined with the advancements made 
with the West, allowed Sweden to become more vocal as a moral power, and morality took 





















The Decline of Cooperation 1980 – 1989 
 East – West relations suffered during the transition from the 1970s to the 1980s, 
primarily because the Soviet Union became more aggressive. Such instances of aggression 
include the invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 and several submarine incursions in Swedish 
waters. Soviet aggressiveness gave the Swedes a reason to worry and think about their 
security. In 1981, the minister of defense restricted declaratory doctrine again as a member of 
parliament questioned him regarding statements made to a newspaper about security policy. 
He responded that “insofar as these statements have given the impression that the Swedish 
armed forces anticipate any kind of cooperation with NATO, this is totally incorrect”; 
therefore, according to the doctrine this laid out, Swedish defense plans could not even 
consider accounting for any aid from NATO.95  
A year prior, a report mentioned that NATO had cruise missiles capable of overflying 
Sweden, which would be an infringement on Swedish neutrality. Minister of Defense Erik 
Krönmark claimed that “Sweden must ensure that its armed forces are capable of engaging 
cruise missiles which could pass through Swedish airspace”; thus, it was made clear that it 
would be in accordance with Swedish declaratory doctrine to shoot down NATO 
overflights.96 As stated previously, Swedish officials had given assurance to the United States 
in the 1940s and 1950s that they would permit overflights in peacetime and wartime; 
therefore, this represents a further shift away from the West in declaratory doctrine.  
While Soviet aggressiveness made the Swedes more security-conscious, they were 
also intent on abiding by Nilsson and Palme’s precedents for the active foreign policy. The 
coalition government was outspoken against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan nearly as 
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much as the SAP government under Palme was against the United States’ involvement in 
Vietnam.97 In late 1981, the first confirmed instance of Soviet submarines intruding in 
Swedish territory became known, for a Soviet Whiskey-class submarine, U-137, ran aground 
near Karlskrona, a Swedish naval base on the southeastern coast. Much to the alarm of the 
Swedes, they found evidence of radioactive material on the submarine that would be 
consistent with that of nuclear torpedoes, and a Swedish policy goal, pushed for by Palme, 
was a nuclear-free zone in Scandinavia. Several months later, “periscopes were sighted off 
the coastal cities of Holmogadd and Sundsvall,” and more sightings followed.98  
Palme regained power in the election the following year. His foreign minister was 
Lennart Bodström, an unqualified man with no experience with foreign policy, and Palme 
purposefully appointed such a man as he wished to conduct foreign policy himself.  Although 
he had the power of an SAP government behind him, Palme had to deal with the difficulties 
that the publicity of the Soviet intrusion received. One of his primary goals was to investigate 
the intrusions; therefore, he set up a commission to study sightings and research any issues 
they could find with Swedish defenses. The commission’s findings were not pleasing to 
Palme. They found that the violations had “important implications for Sweden’s security 
policy,” for the multitude of observations of submarine activity that had “been reported to the 
Commission which, taken together, clearly show that these were submarines belonging to the 
Warsaw Pact, i.e., essentially the Soviet Union.”99  
Palme faced the first large divide on Swedish security policy in recent history, for the 
SAP’s opponents claimed that the incursions are clear examples of the failure of the 
neutrality policy. Such critics called the assurance-based neutrality policy into question. They 
believed that a return to a steadfast deterrence-based policy would be the way to solve the 
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current policy’s failure. While these were the beliefs of the government’s adversaries, the 
SAP thought that it should reinforce the assurance-based policy to create “a strong and clear 
neutrality policy.”100 Palme handled this divide in a similar manner to Erlander in 1959. He 
declared that the statements by the opposition were conflicting with Sweden’s neutrality 
policy; therefore, the government censored any criticism that they found compromised the 
assurance-based policy. Thus, the government had drastically reduced criticism of the Soviet 
Union and the potential failure of the neutrality policy.  
By reinforcing assurance-based neutrality, Palme was able to maintain the balance of 
insecurity and morality within Swedish neutrality policy that placed a greater emphasis on 
morality. Since first coming to power in the 1960s, Palme had been focused on increasing 
Swedish influence as a moral power; therefore, it was of key importance to him to maintain 
the shift away from insecurity that he had previously pushed for. While Palme handily dealt 
with the opposition in this matter, Foreign Minister Bodström was more controversial. He 
laid out Bodströmdoktrinen (the Bodström Doctrine) in 1982. This doctrine allowed for 
Sweden to speak out against events in other countries; however, it called for Sweden to “not 
criticize other countries because of their political design.”101  Bodström was also wary of the 
commission’s findings on Soviet submarine activity, and upon the media catching wind of 
such claims, controversy ensued. The SAP’s opponents in Parliament requested a vote for his 
dismissal, and Palme rallied to his defense. Ultimately, Bodström managed to pull through 
unscathed, and mirroring Erlander’s approach to Hjalmarson, Palme castigated the opposition 
as wishing to create a “serious danger to Sweden’s peace.”102 
Palme’s cracking down on the opposition proved effective, for the government was 
able to maintain the overall nature of the security and neutrality policy, assurance, with only 
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an adjustment of a $120 million increase to the defense budget.103 With this budget increase, 
the Swedes quickly began to produce countermeasures for the incursions. These 
countermeasures included several depth charges, torpedoes, and improvements to the 
Swedish detection system by new sonar implementations.104 Policy remained generally 
unchanged with the transition in government; however, a divide was beginning to appear 
among Swedish officials. Palme made clear that a strong, deterrent defense was subsidiary to 
a trust and assurance-based neutrality that was based on Sweden maintaining a moral 
superiority over belligerent nations.105 The minister of defense, Anders Thunborg, made it 
clear that he viewed a strong defense for military deterrence a primary goal for Swedish 
policy, and he made no mention, as Palme so often did, of assurance and trust being more 
important than this for Swedish defense.106 
As mentioned above, the Swedes had sold two-thirds of the facility that they built 
near Trondheim in Norway for the importation of oil and war material. They brokered this 
deal in 1983 with the Norwegian company Norske Fina A/S, and Norske Fina began to use 
the facility for “fuel delivery to NATO’s Air Force troops in northern Norway.”107 As 
relations between the East and West had taken a turn for the worse in the 1980s, Sweden, as 
displayed by their declaratory doctrine for the period, was highly cautious regarding its 
perceived connections to the West; therefore, they found that it was desirable to distance 
themselves from NATO in Norway by selling the entirety of the Trondheim facility. This was 
set into motion by the Riksdag in 1986, for they “authorized the government to transfer the 
shares in AB Oil Transit to Norske Fina.”108  
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While the desire to distance themselves from the West was a factor in the sale, several 
other factors played into the decision to sell the facility at this time, for since the construction 
of the facility in the 1960s, Sweden increased its capacity for storing aviation fuel and oil 
within its own boundaries. Furthermore, the strategic value of the facility was less than the 
Swedes had hoped, for they scrapped plans to construct a pipeline to connect the facility to 
Sweden for transport of oil and fuel owing to budgetary concerns. This caused the Swedes to 
rely on rail for the transport of such material from the facility; however, a larger concern with 
the perceived relationship with NATO led to the timing of the sale. The Norwegians were 
using the portion of the facility that they owned to regularly supply a nearby NATO airbase; 
therefore, the Swedes became concerned with the connection to NATO with (part of) their 
facility fueling NATO aircraft.109 The government found this to be hazardous to the 
conditions of their neutrality policy; thus, they found that the combination of these factors 
would best be abated by selling their remaining portion of the facility. 
The defense committee released a report in 1985, and this report followed the trend of 
those preceding it. It adhered to the line of 1959, that preparations for cooperation from 
abroad in wartime were not compatible with neutrality.110 Personal contacts were upheld as 
per DNS planning in the 1950s.111 Furthermore, the plans that were made for wartime 
importation from the West were maintained throughout this period too; however, this 
changed in 1984.112 The Swedish defense staff was shaken up in the early 1980s, and the 
control of DNS planning was shifted accordingly. This led to new management over existing 
plans; however, the new managers did not agree with the secret planning that did not align 
with doctrine. Furthermore, many were uninformed about the extent of preparations as the 
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result of the failure of previous governments to pass on this secret information.113 This caused 
a bit of a confusion among the defense staff. After several consultations between staff 
members, it was decided by ÖB Lung that all documents pertaining to the planning should be 
shredded; thus, by 1984, “all the documents relating to cooperation with the West in his 
possession had been shredded.”114 The destruction of these documents brought an end to the 
DNS planning that had been ongoing for thirty-five years. 
 The implication from this is that the planning was occurring almost independently of 
the politicians by bureaucrats, and that as planning became more intricate the politicians 
slowly were less and less involved. Recalling back to the foundation of cooperation with 
Swedlund, he regularly updated Erlander and Unden and their approval was required to begin 
cooperation; however, by the time of Palme, politicians were aware of the planning but took 
no part in it. As part of the assurance policy, perhaps the politicians deliberately removed 
themselves and placed the planning on bureaucrats to make their public statements appear 
more sincere.  
While DNS planning came to an end in 1984, SveNorDa arrangements lived on. 
Training flights were regularly occurring, and they improved communications as “in the mid 
to late 1980s they were upgraded to a higher standard, perhaps as much as 24 channels.”115 
They made these improvements at the behest of Norway and Denmark, for the Swedes 
thought that the current placements were adequate. As with DNS ending, SveNorDa had lost 
its hidden meaning to the Swedes. In the 1950s they took SveNorDa public as a cover for 
cooperation in the field of aviation; however, the Swedes no longer had the memory of its 
intended purpose. Therefore, the Swedish military, by the 1980s, came to view SveNorDa “as 
solely a matter of air safety.”116  
                                               
113 See interviews conducted by Robert Dalsjö and the CNP in Life-Line Lost. 
114 Dalsjö, Life-line Lost, 234 – 235. 
115 Dalsjö, Life-line Lost, 236. 
116 Dalsjö, Life-line Lost, 236. 
Byrne 46 
An unknown gunman murdered Palme on 28 February 1986. His successor was 
Ingvar Carlsson, and he declared that he would follow the same foreign policy line as Palme 
had. Despite this declaration, slight adjustments occurred. When expressing doctrine in 1986, 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs Sten Andersson spoke out against social conditions in the 
Soviet Union; therefore, he effectively renounced the Bodström doctrine.117  
Furthermore, in contrast from Swedish policies from the 1950s and 1960s, he spoke 
about the prospect of Swedish membership in the EC; thus, the issue of an outside 
organization, such as the EC, taking primacy over the nation was no longer incompatible with 
Swedish neutrality.118 Officials maintained that neutrality should provide Sweden with a 
freedom of action, and they stressed the importance of assuring other that they “can hold trust 
and respect for our will and ability to adhere to the chosen foreign policy line.”119 The 
Carlsson government would uphold Palme’s active foreign policy with a goal “aimed at 
relaxation, international disarmament, and peaceful development.”120  
With the end of détente and the intensification of East – West relations, declaratory 
doctrine restricted Swedish options for external aid, and in the case of Western overflights, 
overturned previous assurances given to the United States. Soviet submarine incursions 
presented a problem for Palme’s return to government; however, his appointment of an 
investigative committee helped soften the blow. Furthermore, he cracked down on political 
opposition and outspokenness in a manner eerily like that of the Hjalmarson affair in 1959. 
Foreign Minister Bodström took the line even further by mandating that Sweden could not 
speak out against social conditions in other countries. Palme justified this with the belief that 
a strong assurance-based defense would put an end to the Soviet intrusions; however, this 
proved to be incorrect.   
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Compared to the previous periods, this one was rather short of developments, for it 
put a stop to arrangements that Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and the West had fostered for 
decades. DNS planning ended, for the new Swedish officials were uninformed and no longer 
understood the hidden purpose behind SveNorDa, and they sold the remaining third of the 
reception facility at Trondheim, cutting off a crucial route for material from the West. This 
decision came as a result of a mix of Palme’s desire to maintain the moral superiority in 
Sweden’s neutral balance, the danger to this moral superiority if Sweden was linked to the 
facility’s Norwegian component supplying a nearby NATO base, and the inefficient manner 
in which the facility could transport material to Sweden in wartime.  Palme’s death led to a 
change in government, and this new Carlsson government, which generally upheld previous 
policies, renounced the Bodström doctrine; however, they continued to support an assurance-
based defense allowing for morality to continue to take precedence in the balance between 
morality and insecurity in Sweden’s neutrality policy. Furthermore, Carlsson’s government 
began to view EC membership in a positive light. This was a fundamental step in the future 
of Sweden’s neutrality policy, for it was the next step towards morality dominating Swedish 












The End of the Cold War and the New Role of NATO 
1990 – Present 
 As the iron curtain fell, NATO no longer had a clear purpose, for their traditional 
opponents, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, ceased to pose a threat as they 
disintegrated. Therefore, NATO had to find a role in the new security environment that 
emerged. NATO’s new approach placed an increased focus on the political field; however, 
the defensive aspect of the original strategy remained valid. NATO’s new objectives are 
descriptive of a peacekeeping force, for the three of the four security functions laid out in 
NATO’s new policy was 
 
To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in 
Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the 
peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or 
coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force. 
. . .To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any 
NATO member state. . . . To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.121 
 
 
Therefore, NATO continued to function as a means of defense for member nations; however, 
NATO became increasingly political as it sought to foster conflict resolution and 
democratization through peaceful means.  
 In order to fulfill the strategic objective of maintaining a stable security environment 
in Europe, NATO became responsible for dealing with crisis management. Again, NATO’s 
plan for approaching this new role was through a mix of political and military measures, and 
as the opposing great power military alliance fell, a large force was no longer necessary. 
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NATO found it more appropriate to maintain a smaller, more adaptable force, for such a 
force would be able to quickly respond to crisis situations.122 NATO pledged to abide by the 
framework laid out by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and 
the UN and NATO would aid “on a case by case basis in accordance with [their] own 
procedures” peacekeeping initiatives of the UN and CSCE.123 This worked to legitimize 
NATO’s ability to operate as a crisis management and peacekeeping force endorsed by the 
UN and CSCE. 
 By acquiring the approval of the UN and CSCE, NATO was more palatable to the 
Swedes, for they had been long-time adherents to UN resolutions. During this period, the 
Gulf War was raging, and the UN passed a resolution that approved the use of military force 
if Iraq refused to withdraw within a given deadline. The Swedes, although maintaining 
neutrality, declared that 
 
We do not stand neutral in the conflict. This is not a war between the United States 
and Iraq. . . . As a loyal UN member, we have, from the start, supported all resolutions 
that were approved in the UN Security Council. Our support for the UN is grounded 
in the organization’s ultimate purpose to uphold international peace and security. The 
fulfillment of this objective may, in accordance with the UN Charter, as a last resort, 
require the use of armed force when other solutions are insufficient.124 
 
 
Therefore, the Swedes were willing to depart from neutrality to support peacekeeping 
initiatives that the UN supported. Furthermore, as the threat to the east disappeared, Sweden 
became more willing to partake in such operations. As discussed above, Sweden adopted an 
active foreign policy in the 1960s as Palme shifted Swedish neutrality towards focusing on 
morality over insecurity, and as displayed during the Vietnam War and the Soviet invasion of 
                                               
122 Legge, “The making of,” 9. 
123 “London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance July 6, 1990,” American Reference 
Library – Primary Source Documents (2001), 1; John Kriendler, “NATO’s Changing Role 
Opportunities and Constraints for Peacekeeping,” NATO Review, Vol. 41, No. 3, (June 1993), 16. 
124 Riksdagens snabbprotokoll 1990/91:51 (Stockholm: Sveriges Regering, 1990). 
Byrne 50 
Afghanistan, the Swedes were increasingly willing to speak out on peacekeeping issues. 
Although they spoke out about these issues, they would not actively participate in any 
interventional peacekeeping initiatives; however, with the Soviet threat gone, Sweden would 
now be more receptive of transferring their morality, through their active foreign policy, from 
rhetoric to practice. 
 Sweden was furthermore open to deviating from its traditional view of neutrality and 
non-alignment resulting from its economic situation. In 1990, the government rolled out 
measures to combat the recession to put the economy back on track. Previously, the Swedes 
were against membership in the EC. Until 1990, it was not a government objective to gain 
such a membership. Sweden sought to secure a membership within the EC in which they 
could maintain their neutral status. As of 1990, Sweden continued its policy of neutrality and 
non-alignment; however, the government believed that they could find a way to cooperate 
with the EC while maintaining this policy. Prime Minister Carlsson made it clear that the 
government believed that in the “EC’s foreign and security policies, cooperation can be such 
an approach and design that it excludes binding foreign policy cooperation and a common 
defense policy.”125 
 Sweden subsequently applied for membership in the EC on 1 July 1991. At this time, 
Sweden’s declaratory doctrine still maintained the classic model of neutrality and non-
alignment; however, beginning in 1992, the wording of statements on neutrality shifted. The 
new formulation appeared in a defense report, and it took a much laxer approach to 
neutrality. As the Soviet threat had passed, there was no longer a need to emphasize the 
assurance aspect of the neutrality policy; therefore, the new phrase, “no other defends 
Sweden, and we defend only Sweden,” was largely representative of the shift that the lack of 
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such a threat allowed for.126 In the same year, the foreign affairs committee made a statement 
that followed this line. In pursuing an active foreign policy backed by their moral neutrality, 
the Swedes certainly wanted to avoid being pulled into wars through collective defense pacts 
that could potentially undermine their moral superiority; therefore, it was of the utmost 
importance that they remain aloof from coming to the defense of others based on contractual 
obligations.  
Their statement had also left out mention of the creditability of the neutrality policy; 
thus, policy had made a rather important modification. They crafted this statement with 
cooperation with organizations in Europe in mind. They stressed that “the alliance free policy 
does not require that Sweden, in any other respects, should need to impose restrictions on 
itself regarding participation in the growing, multifaceted European cooperation.”127 
Therefore, one of the core tenets of Swedish security doctrine since the initial shift towards 
morality in the 1960s, assurance, had fallen into obscurity by 1992, and only the alliance free 
aspect of the original policy from the previous forty years remained. By 1993, the Swedish 
doctrine continued to evolve, and the Prime Minister declared that “Sweden will be an active 
and committed participant in the evolution of the common foreign and security policy 
[CSFP].”128 This statement contradicted the doctrine from 1992, for it implies that Sweden, as 
an active participant in the CFSP, would defend more than itself. In 1994, the government 
passed the decision to join the EC/EU to the Swedish people in a referendum, and they 
narrowly decided to accept. 
In the early 1990s, NATO also moved to broaden the horizons of its ability to operate 
in a peacekeeping manner, for they began to create initiatives for non-member states, such as 
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Sweden, to work alongside NATO in non-Article 5 operations. In 1991, NATO created the 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), and the goal was to establish a basis for 
cooperation with NATO’s former adversaries, the member nations of the Warsaw Pact.129  
The Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative further supplemented the NACC.  
While the NACC was based on forming a basis for dialogue and cooperation, PfP 
intended to “expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, 
increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by 
promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that 
underpin our Alliance.”130 Furthermore, states that participated in PfP would be eligible to 
participate in “operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the 
CSCE”; therefore, states, such as Sweden, that had previously advocated for the protection of 
human rights and the proliferation of peace were now able to participate in peacekeeping 
operations, approved by the UN and the CSCE, that were spearheaded by NATO. 131 
 Sweden took the opportunity to extend its morality abroad by joining the PfP on 9 
May 1994; thus, NATO’s function in relation to Sweden had transformed.132 As discussed 
above, throughout the Cold War NATO served as a conduit for cooperation between Sweden 
and the West. As NATO changed its goals, it became a valuable organization by its own 
standing, for it allowed Sweden to act on strictly rhetorical morality. This accession came a 
few short months prior to the referendum on EU membership, and it displayed Sweden’s 
willingness to contribute to international security. A year later, Sweden issued a joint 
statement with Finland regarding their desires for the EU’s CFSP, and they made it clear that 
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they wanted the EU to put a focus on “asserting an enhanced crisis management role. . . with 
due account taken to the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for international 
peace and security.”133 Therefore, the Swedes wanted the EU to take responsibility in aiding 
in international security and peacekeeping initiatives, in accordance with the UN, as NATO 
already had three years prior.  
 The Swedes wished to create a focus for the CFSP on crisis management and 
peacekeeping, very similar to the post-Cold War role of NATO. In a report in late 1995, 
Sweden proclaimed that “Sweden did not declare its intention to prevent development in this 
direction [towards a common EU defense]. At the same time, the government has repeatedly 
pointed out that Sweden is not prepared to receive or issue any military security guarantees. 
Participation in a common defense will therefore not be our part.”134 Swedish security policy, 
while no longer containing the hardline of a credible neutrality, maintained that Sweden 
would stand aloof from military alliances. Swedish actions in the early to mid-1990s clearly 
portray this, for they avoided any alignment through defense pacts and strived for security 
cooperation through peacekeeping. This is the manifestation of the Swedish morality driven 
neutrality. The Swedes were aiming to expand peacekeeping initiatives in which they can 
export their moral judgment to ensure stability; however, they were unwilling to commit to 
any initiatives that would require them to become embroiled in a conflict that could 
potentially compromise their moral superiority.  
 While working to set the EU on a path like NATO regarding international security, 
Sweden worked to strengthen its cooperation with NATO. Although the Swedes were 
working with the EU concurrently with NATO, EU defense and security proceedings became 
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secondary to those through NATO. This was primarily a result of NATO’s superior 
organization; however, that is not to dismiss EU initiatives. The EU implemented 
battlegroups, of which Sweden has led the creation of two; however, the battlegroups have 
never deployed.135  
Sweden joined the PfP Planning and Review Process in 1995, for they found it to 
satisfy their “interest in promoting an effective cooperation for peacekeeping, rescue and 
humanitarian efforts.”136 Furthermore, Sweden began to change its military to conform to 
such peacekeeping exercises. The government displayed a desire to adapt their forces to 
support NATO’s “Implementation Force (IFOR) that is developing.”137 To achieve further 
cohesion with NATO forces, the Swedes began to conform to NATO standards for 
communications; however, this was not a new concept to the Swedes. As noted above, 
Sweden had begun to implement NATO communication standards during the 1960s when 
SveNorDa went public, for Swedish operators were communicating with Norway and 
Denmark, NATO members, in English. Thus, by the 1990s when Sweden began to formalize 
ties with NATO, Swedish troops had extensive experience with NATO terminology.  
 When the UN turned over leadership of UNPROFOR in Bosnia to NATO in 1995, 
NATO created IFOR as the force to implement the peace agreement. Swedish troops had 
already been in place in the area under UNPROFOR, and they remained as the UN 
transferred control to IFOR. This was Sweden’s first operation under NATO leadership. In 
the following years, Sweden continued to expand its cooperation with NATO, and by the 
time that the 1990s ended, Sweden managed to obtain its original objective laid out when 
joining the PfP as they had contributed to the peacekeeping forces of IFOR and KFOR.  
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 Relations between Sweden and NATO continued to improve throughout the early 
2000s, and Swedish doctrine evolved again in 2004. A defense report stated that “threats to 
people and countries have changed in character and gained another meaning. It is no longer 
possible for countries to consider their security in isolation from developments in the rest of 
the world”; however, doctrine maintained that, “Sweden is militarily non-aligned.”138 
Following this doctrine, Sweden continued to participate in security and peacekeeping affairs 
abroad through the UN and NATO. Beginning in 2002, Sweden participated in NATO 
operations in Afghanistan through the ISAF, and Sweden would continue to contribute to this 
effort until the end of ISAF operation in 2014.139 When the ISAF operation ended, Sweden 
continued to work with NATO to uphold the peace in Afghanistan through a non-military 
initiative, the RSM.140  
 In 2007, the Defense Committee declared that Sweden “would not be passive if 
another EU nation, or a Nordic country was threatened by catastrophe or an attack”; however, 
it was acknowledged that the EU does not qualify as a military alliance.141 The Swedes 
reiterated this in a 2009 policy statement as they found that the option of neutrality was no 
longer viable if an attack occurred in their area.142 The same statement expressed a 
continuation of the evolution of doctrine that occurred in 1993, for the 1992 self-defense 
stance was contradicted as the government declared that “Sweden will not stand idly by if a 
disaster or attack would hit another member state or Nordic country. We expect these 
countries to respond the same way if Sweden is affected.”143 Therefore, quite the opposite 
had become doctrine from the 1992 statement. Sweden made it clear that it would come to 
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the aid of others, and they detailed that Sweden expected such aid in return. This, combined 
with the continuation of advancing cooperation with NATO discussed below, is likely a result 
of the Swedish threat perception in their security environment, for Russia had begun to figure 
in more prominently. 
 Sweden continued to further its cooperation with NATO as an Enhanced Opportunity 
Partner, a status granted during the Wales Summit in 2014, and this status entails, as the 
name suggests, enhanced opportunities for cooperation. Sweden was particularly focused in 
the security of Sweden and Finland within NATO.144 This trend of steadily increasing 
cooperation continued, and on 4 September 2014, Sweden signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding on Host State Support regarding NATO. This document obliges the host 
country, Sweden, to “provide effective support for military activities in its territory in 
connection with exercises, crisis management or other efforts”; however, they aptly pointed 
out that Sweden only invokes this agreement when they extend an invitation to NATO 
countries or staff to enter Sweden.145 
 Sweden has worked to form closer ties to NATO as the Russian threat has returned. 
Russia remained relatively weak, in the Swedish perspective, throughout the beginning of this 
period; however, Russia reappeared on Sweden’s radar when a Russian military exercise 
came very close to Swedish territory in 2013. On 29 March, Sweden detected six Russian 
planes flying across the Gulf of Finland, and they turned towards the Swedish mainland. Of 
the six planes, two were TU-22M3s heavy bombers. These bombers came, “30 – 40 
kilometers outside Sweden’s territorial boundary.”146 The Swedish Air Force did not mount a 
response as they were unprepared; however, NATO took the initiative by scrambling two 
Danish F16s from a nearby facility in Lithuania. According to NATO Secretary General Jen 
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Stollenberg, this was a simulated nuclear strike, and similar exercises “have been used to 
mask massive movements of military forces. . . . And to menace Russia’s neighbours.”147 
This Russian threat served to shift the Swedish opinion of collective security and defense, for 
as stated above, the Swedes began to expect help from their neighbors in the event of an 
attack and claimed that they would reciprocate if such an event arose. Therefore, Swedish 
cooperation with NATO remained based in morality and peacekeeping; however, the Russian 
threat dusted off Swedish insecurities, opening Sweden up to the idea of collective security 
and defense. Despite the growing threat, Sweden remained opposed to formalizing such 
collective security arrangements.  
 Russian incursions continued. The Swedes spotted a submarine in the Stockholm 
archipelago in October 2014. Strikingly like the Soviet submarine incursions in the 1980s, the 
Swedish military began hunting for it. 200 men were included in this search; however, 
contact was not made.148 It was later confirmed by ÖB Sverker Göranson that, “[t]here is no 
doubt, all other explanations are excluded. Sweden has been subjected to a gross and 
unacceptable violation of foreign power.”149 As these two incidents reflected, the Swedes had 
allowed a lapse in their defense capabilities, for they were unable to adequately respond to 
the Russian presence. The Russian invasion of Ukraine served to further heighten anxieties in 
Sweden, and in 2014, the Defense Committee sought to address recent events. They decided 
that Sweden remained “militarily non-aligned, but without the military capabilities we once 
had. It is time for a clear new Swedish defense and security line.”150 Later that same year, 
changes did come. In December 2014, the government activated “the dormant duty 
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legislation [The National Total Defense Service],” and this act reinstated compulsory military 
service, “only if the government decides it is in accordance with Sweden’s defense 
preparedness.”151  
 The Swedes have continued to become more alert as the Russia’s goals remain 
uncertain, and the 2015 defense policy bill began by noting that, “the security situation in 
Europe has deteriorated. The Russian leadership has shown that it is prepared to use its 
military capability to achieve its political objectives.”152 To meet these changes, it was 
suggested that Sweden work to deepen cooperation in bilateral and multilateral scenarios, 
specifically noting cooperation with Finland. This cooperation with Finland was defined to be 
inclusive of “operational planning and preparation for the joint use of civil and military 
resources in different scenarios.”153 In a near mirror image to the 1950s – 1970s, Sweden’s 
relationship with Norway and Denmark was said to be based upon their membership in 
NATO and Sweden’s relationship with the United States; however, the nature of their 
relationship was certainly no longer the same as it once had been.154 While advocating for 
increased cooperation with the West and Finland, the cornerstone of Swedish defense and 
security policy was being militarily non-aligned.  
 Sweden continues to expand its cooperation with NATO. The Swedes had to re-
evaluate their involvement with NATO in Afghanistan through the RSM, and they decided 
that, as the security situation in Afghanistan has been deteriorating with the UN reporting 
5,000 civilian casualties in the opening months of 2018, Afghanistan “has a continuing need 
for international military support for the development of the Afghan security structures’ 
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ability to cope.”155 Therefore, the government found that the situation requires “continued 
Swedish military contribution to the RSM”; thus, Sweden is still operating with NATO, 
through the RSM, in Afghanistan to the modern day.156  
Furthermore, Sweden is acting on its declarations from 2015 as their insecurity gained 
the greatest footing in relation to morality since it was overtaken by morality in the 1960s. 
Recently, the Swedes have increased cooperation with Finland, for the two governments 
signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation in 2018. This memorandum 
defined the purpose of such cooperation to be to strengthen, “the defence capabilities of the 
Participants [Finland and Sweden], creating prerequisites for combined joint military action 
and operations in all situations, and to further common interests in the defence domain, 
including strengthening the security of the Baltic Sea region.”157 Furthermore, the 
cooperation discussed in the memorandum applies to peacetime, wartime, and time of crisis; 
however, the cooperation that it establishes does not contain any obligations for mutual 
defense.158 Therefore, Sweden has, thus far, abided by the pillar of military non-alignment. 
This period proved quite eventful for Swedish neutrality and defense policy. 
Beginning with the fall of the iron curtain, the dissolution of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, 
Sweden had to reevaluate their policy, for one of the great powers that it stood between had 
fallen. Coinciding with these events, NATO had a loss of purpose as its rival left the scene; 
therefore, it had to reconsider what its role would be in the new security environment. This 
decision came in 1991, and NATO became invested in peacekeeping through the CSCE and 
the UN. Sweden had been supportive of the UN since its foundation, and with NATO 
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operating as an arm of the UN for peacekeeping initiatives, Sweden was presented with the 
opportunity to work alongside them while maintaining their moral neutrality.  
Sweden continued to maintain the policy of military non-alignment; however, in 2007 
they confirmed that they would not stand by if anyone attacked an EU or Nordic nation. In 
2009, they went further by proclaiming that neutrality was not an option in the case of a local 
attack. Russian actions in Europe led to a deteriorating security situation, and Russian 
incursions near and into Swedish territory led to heightened anxieties about the threat to the 
East. This spurred the Swedes to consider collective defense and security as compatible with 



















Conclusion: Wrapping Up 
 Sweden’s neutrality and non-alignment policy has been in existence for over 200 
years; however, the last seventy years have proven to be a transformative period in which this 
policy was constantly evolving. Sweden managed to avoid direct involvement in two of the 
largest conflicts in recent history, the First and Second World Wars, by following such a 
policy. The period of transformation began in 1948 and continues to the present with the 
Swedes making modifications as the global security climate changes. Sweden made its most 
recent changes in 2015; however, it has been acting on those changes since. As the format of 
the above chapters show, this thesis divides Swedish policy into small periods throughout the 
last seventy years based on policymaking and operational trends. I have divided these years 
into four periods, and before analyzing the totality of the evolution that Swedish policy has 
taken throughout the entirety of the period, I will briefly summarize each period.  
 In the aftermath of the Second World War, Swedish neutrality placed far more weight 
on insecurity than morality, and in the hopes of curtailing their insecurity, they sought to 
form a collective security arrangement through the SDU. After this failed, the Swedes 
realized that they were on their own and were quickly falling behind the United States and the 
USSR as their military technology rapidly advanced; therefore, their insecurity was 
heightened. They approached the United States hoping to obtain their military technology in 
exchange for a covert Western lean. Until the early 1950s the relationship between the United 
States and Sweden is characteristic of a struggle to find a balance between such a Western 
lean and a technological exchange.   
 The United States initially took a hardline towards Swedish neutrality; however, 
policy began to soften up in the early 1950s. It was certainly not an American objective to 
secure Swedish membership in a Western alliance, like NATO, in NSC 28/1; however, the 
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United States did wish for a Western lean from the Swedes. While United States policy 
softened, it was not the primary reason for the increase in cooperation. The Swedes had 
authorized cooperation in the late 1940s, and in 1950, they baked an allowance for such 
cooperation into their declaratory doctrine without departing from neutrality. They did this 
because their neutrality policy at this point was motivated by their insecurity; therefore, the 
policy of the United States did become more accepting of the Swedish policy of neutrality, 
but only so long as they received assurances from the Swedes that they aligned with the 
West. The Swedes did not depart from neutrality either; however, they created a loophole in 
their neutrality to allow for the western lean that the United States desired.  
The second period, 1953 – 1979, focused on expanding cooperation between Sweden 
and the West; however, the rise of Olof Palme became problematic for their relationship. In 
the early stages of this period, cooperation continued as it did before, a struggle to find and 
maintain a balance agreeable to the United States and Sweden to allow for Western 
technology to flow into Sweden in exchange for security assurances. In the 1960s, Olof 
Palme came to power, and his criticism of U.S. actions in Vietnam led to diplomatic ties 
being cut for a brief period. Despite this, covert cooperation continued; however, Palme 
began to shift Swedish neutrality away from insecurity and towards the other component – 
morality, and in doing so, he created a balance that slightly favored morality. Coinciding with 
this, Sweden began to follow an assurance-based neutrality, for they sought to assure the 
Soviets that Sweden, as a moral power, would not act against them.  
East – West relations suffered during the 1980s, and Swedish policy certainly displays 
this change. Soviet aggressiveness increased as they invaded Afghanistan in 1979, and 
several instances of Soviet incursions into Swedish territory occurred. This led to the Palme 
government focusing on reassuring the Soviets that they were neutral and would remain so. 
Furthermore, the Swedes were increasingly worried about the Soviet view of their 
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relationship with the West; therefore, they walked back on previous assurances given to the 
United States. Although the Swedes were worried about their connection to the West, they 
were also critical of Soviet actions. Similar to Palme’s approach to U.S. actions in Vietnam, 
he was outspoken against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, for he was intent on continuing 
to place morality over insecurity in the neutral balance.   
In the early 1990s, NATO began to work as an enforcer of UN policies and decisions 
as a peacekeeping force, for the Soviet threat had been removed. The lack of this threat led to 
Swedish insecurity being nearly eliminated; therefore, morality took the forefront of Swedish 
neutrality. Based on their moral stance, the Swedes felt compelled to partake in UN backed 
peacekeeping operations, even if they were carried out by NATO. NATO created new 
initiatives to foster increased cooperation, Sweden worked to increase cooperation to a point, 
for they continued to remain aloof from collective defense. As Russian aggressiveness 
cropped up in the middle of this period, Sweden reassessed their security environment while 
considering their rising insecurity and determined that collective defense is necessary; 
however, they are still unwilling to formalize such arrangements as they could hinder their 
ability to maintain their status as a moral power.  
From 1949 – 1952 the primary issue the Swedes faced was the rapid technological 
advancement of the United States and the Soviet Union, for it was invalidating their defense 
strategy. As an adjustment to this reality, the Swedes modified their neutrality policy to focus 
on their insecurities; therefore, their policy was molded around what needed to be done to 
rectify their insecurities. As it happens, this would be a Western lean in exchange for U.S. 
military technology. This would continue until the 1960s, for Palme’s rise to power brought 
about a change in the focus of Swedish neutrality. Since Sweden had already made deals with 
the United States to obtain military technology like radar and guided missiles, Palme was 
able to shift neutrality towards a more moral stance. In doing so, he created an active foreign 
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policy that involved voicing Sweden’s moral superiority to both condemn U.S. actions in 
Vietnam and assure the Soviets that Sweden posed them no threat. The 1980s was a turbulent 
period where the balance between morality and insecurity was generally maintained in 
Swedish neutrality; however, the 1990s would lead to a massive swing towards morality with 
insecurity creeping back only recently as Russian aggression continued.   
As it happens, Swedish cooperation with NATO in the post-Cold War period is 
fundamentally different from Swedish cooperation with NATO and the West during the Cold 
War. They based their Cold War cooperation on Swedish insecurity for defense and national 
security; whereas, post-Cold War cooperation was based on Swedish morality through 
international security and peacekeeping efforts. Sweden’s attitude in respect to the West did 
not necessarily change, for NATO updated its purpose in response to the evolving security 
environment. This evolution consisted of NATO becoming a peacekeeping organization 
backed by the UN; therefore, as a moral power and a supporter of the UN, Sweden came to 
back NATO peacekeeping operations. The PfP simply allowed Sweden to have an increased 
role in the decision-making process in these peacekeeping operations. The commonality 
between the various periods studied here is Swedish neutrality; however, the balance of the 
components that make up that neutrality, insecurity and morality, are the variables. Since the 
Second World War, Swedish neutrality has moved from a balance favoring insecurity over 
morality, to a more even balance with a slight favor towards morality, to its current state, one 
which heavily favors morality. Therefore, Swedish attitude towards the West did not 
necessarily change as they began to formalize their cooperation with NATO, for the changing 
factor has always been the search for a neutral balance between insecurity and morality that 
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